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CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
Robert L. Freed*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate and business law has undergone a variety of
changes in the past two years. This article summarizes the
developments that occurred in this area of the law from June
1996, through June 1998. In 1997, the Virginia General Assem-
bly amended numerous provisions of the Virginia Code. The
amendments became effective January 1, 1998. Virginia state
courts and the federal courts have issued opinions which have
impacted the law in this area. Part II examines the abundant
legislative changes made to title 13.1 of the Virginia Code and
the recent judicial decisions affecting corporations. Most of the
changes discussed were made by the 1997 Session of the Vir-
ginia General Assembly. The 1998 Session made very few nota-
ble changes to the Virginia Code. Part M discusses the recent
legislative and judicial developments affecting limited liability
companies. And finally, Part IV reviews the recent legislative
developments affecting partnerships, but does not address the
amendments to the Virginia Uniform Partnership Act which
were made by the General Assembly in its 1996 Session.1
Robert L. Freed, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.S., 1969, Virginia Commonwealth
University; J.D., 1972, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
The author acknowledges the invaluable efforts of Cathryn A. Le, Law Clerk,
Robert L. Freed, P.C., without whom this paper would not have been produced.
1. For a discussion of amendments made to the Virginia Uniform Partnership
Act, see William A. Musgrove, Business and Corporate Law, 30 U. RICH. L. REV.
1219, 1256-57 (1996). For a brief discussion of certain sections of the Virginia Uni-
form Partnership Act affecting mergers of partnerships with another entity, see infra
notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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II. CORPORATIONS
A. Legislative Changes-Deadlines
The 1997 Session of the Virginia General Assembly amended
numerous sections of title 13.1 of the Virginia Code. Some of
the amendments became effective immediately and some of the
amendments did not become effective until January 1, 1998.2
Fewer amendments were made to title 13.1 of the Virginia
Code in the 1998 Session of the Virginia General Assembly
than in its 1997 Session.
The 1997 Session amended several deadlines which became
-effective January 1, 1998. Stock corporations and nonstock
corporations must pay annual registration fees to the State Cor-
poration Commission ("the Commission"), pursuant to Virginia
Code sections 13.1-615' and 13.1-815' respectively. A corpora-
tion that has filed effectively a certificate of te-rination, with-
drawal, or merger by a specified date will not have to pay the
registration fee for that year. The 1997 Session eliminated
March 15 as the cutoff date and, instead, amended the statute
to provide that, if the certificate is effective by the date the
annual report of the corporation is due,5 then that corporation
will not have to pay the registration fee for that year.6
In addition, the Commission will reassess the registration fee
for a foreign corporation if it effectively amends its articles of
incorporation to reduce the number of shares it is authorized to
issue. The 1997 Session eliminated January 1 as the cutoff date
and, instead, amended the statute to provide that, if the foreign
stock corporation makes the amendment to its articles effective
by the date that the Commission is required to assess the
corporation's registration fee, the Commission will reassess the
fee.'
2. See infra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-615(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
4. Id. § 13.1-815(A) (Cur. Supp. 1998).
5. For a stock corporation, the due date for the annual report is provided in
Virginia Code section 13.1-775(C). Id. § 13.1-775(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998); see infra note
14 and accompanying text. For a nonstock corporation, the due date for the annual
report is provided in Virginia Code section 13.1-936(C). Id. § 13.1-936(C) (Cur. Supp.
1998); see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-615(B), -815(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
7. See id, § 13.1-775.1(B) (Cur. Supp. 1998). Each year, the Commission is re-
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The Commission must terminate automatically the corporate
existence of any domestic corporation when it fails to file annu-
al reports and to pay annual registration fees by a specific
deadline. Virginia Code sections 13.1-752 and 13.1-768, govern-
ing stock and nonstock corporations respectively, now state that
to avoid automatic termination of corporate existence, all corpo-
rations must fie an annual report with the Commission before
the last day of the fourth month immediately following the date
that its annual report is due.'
This amendment was made only to accommodate the amend-
ments made to Virginia Code sections 13.1-775 and 13.1-936, 9
which establish the filing due date of annual reports. Prior to
1998, annual reports were due between January 1 and April 1
of each year; therefore, automatic termination of corporate exis-
tence would occur if annual reports were not filed four months
after April 1, which is September. The 1997 Session of the
General Assembly amended sections 13.1-775 and 13.1-936 such
that the filing due date for each corporation is dependent upon
the corporation's date of incorporation. 10 Consequently, the
General Assembly had to amend sections 13.1-752 and 13.1-768
to allow every corporation an equal opportunity to file its annu-
al report before the Commission terminates its corporate exis-
tence.11
In addition, the Commission must terminate the corporate
existence of a domestic corporation if it fails to pay the annual
registration fee by "the last day of the fourth month immediate-
ly following the due date" of the corporation's annual report."
quired to assess a registration fee for every corporation by a date specified in Virgin-
ia Code section 13.1-775.1(B). See id.
8. See id. §§ 13.1-752(A), -768(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998); see also infra notes 14-15
and accompanying text.
9. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-775(C), -936(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (governing stock
and nonstock corporations); see also infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
10. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-775(C), -936(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
11. See id. §§ 13.1-752, -768 (Cun. Supp. 1998).
12. Id. § 13.1-752(B) (Cum- Supp. 1998) (governing stock and nonstock corpora-
tions); see also infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. If a corporation fails to pay
the annual registration fee, although its corporate existence will not be terminated
until the last day of the fourth month following the filing due date of the annual re-
port, it will have to pay a penalty for any payments made after the annual report
due date. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-752(B)(1), -768(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
1998] 1069 ,
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Similarly, the Commission must automatically revoke the cer-
tificate of authority of a foreign corporation when it fails to
meet the deadlines discussed above. 3
The 1997 Session amended the due date of the annual report
of a domestic or foreign corporation. The annual report must
now be
filed with the Commission by the last day of the twelfth
month next succeeding the date it was incorporated or au-
thorized to transact business in this Commonwealth, and by
such date in each year thereafter. The report shall be filed
no earlier than three months prior to its due date each
year.
14
In the past, annual reports were due between January 1 and
April 1 of each year, without exception; however, the 1997 Ses-
sion of the General Assembly created an exception to the above
deadline by granting the Commission discretion to extend the
filing due date on a monthly basis for up to eleven months. 5
The Commission has to assess the registration fee that each
corporation must pay "as of the first day of the second month
next preceding the month of the corporation's annual registra-
tion fee due date each year."6 If such due date has been ex-
tended pursuant to section 13.1-775(C) or section 13.1-936(C),
the Commission will increase the assessment "by a prorated
amount to cover the period of extension." 7 After the assess-
ment has been made as provided in the amended Virginia
Code, 8 each corporation has to pay its annual registration fee
13. See VA. CODE ANN. at §§ 13.1-768 to 930 (Cum. Supp. 1998) (governing the
automatic revocation of the certificate of authority of a foreign stock and nonstock
corporation). The Commission may not terminate the corporate existence of a foreign-
corporation, but the Commission does have the authority to prevent the foreign corpo-
ration from transacting business in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
14. Id. §§ 13.1-775(C), -936(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (governing stock and nonstock
corporations).
15. See id.
16. Id. §§ 13.1-775.1(B), -936.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998). The amount of a stock
corporation's registration fee depends on the number of shares it is authorized to
issue. See id. § 13.1-775.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998). Nonstock corporations, however, pay
an annual registration fee of $25. See id. § 13.1-936.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
17. Id. §§ 13.1-775.1(B), -936.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
18. See id §§ 13.1-752(B)(1), -768(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (governing domestic and
foreign stock corporations); id. §§ 13.1-914(BX1), -930(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (govern-
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In Horton v. Howard Horton & Overlord Investments, Inc.,'9
the plaintiff, a fifty percent shareholder in the corporation,
brought an action against the defendant and the defendant
corporation, seeking corporate dissolution on the ground of
shareholder oppression. The plaintiff and the defendant were
married when the defendant transferred fifty percent of the
shares of stock in his corporation to the plaintiff. The transfer
was made to induce the plaintiff to obtain refinancing on other
properties unrelated to those owned by the corporation. Al-
though the plaintiff was a fifty percent shareholder, the defen-
dant excluded the plaintiff from all aspects of the business and
continued to operate the corporation without consulting the
plaintiff.20
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant after
the couple divorced. The defendant argued that when he trans-
ferred the fift percent interest in his corporation, he was un-
der economic duress. The Arlington Circuit Court rejected the
defendant's argument and required that he pay the plaintiff
fifty percent of the value of the corporation or dissolve the cor-
poration and divide the net proceeds of dissolution.2'
The Rockingham Circuit Court also faced a shareholder op-
pression claim in Stickley v. Stickley.22 William Stickley pos-
sessed a thirty-five percent minority interest in J.O. Stickley &
Sons, Inc.' 3 The minority shareholder filed suit against the
majority shareholder, Dan Stickley, Jr., and the corporation,
ing domestic and foreign nonstock corporations).
19. 12 Va. Law. Wldy. 1573 (June 1, 1998).
20. See id.
21. See id
22. 43 Va. Cir. 123 (Rockingham County 1997).
23. See id.
10711998]
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seeking dissolution of the corporation for shareholder oppres-
sion.'
The majority shareholder refused to provide the minority
shareholder with various records and documents that the mi-
nority shareholder had requested. In addition, the majority
shareholder unilaterally changed several agreements. Further-
more, the majority shareholder paid himself unreasonable com-
pensation.' The majority shareholder also negotiated to sell
the company, pretended to discuss the sales transaction with
the minority shareholder after the sales contract had been en-
tered into, filled the board of directors with the majority
shareholder's wife and children, and refused to tell the minority
shareholder the reason that the company's by-laws and articles
of incorporation were amended, all of which were designed to
acquire absolut control of the corporation." The circuit court
found that these activities were "patently oppressive by .any
standard of normal commercial practice and ethics."'
The court further stated that "the total picture of corporate
activity" must be examined in determining whether shareholder
oppression exists.' Although "individual acts in a vacuum"
may "pass the test of probity . . . the pattern and totality of
[those] acts certainly cannot."' As a result of the majority
shareholder's oppression of the minority shareholder, the court
ordered corporate dissolution of the corporation'0 and required
the appointment of a receiver to dissolve and wind up the cor-
poration.3
24. See id.
25. The majority shareholder committed numerous other acts which the court
found to be "openly oppressive conduct." Id, at 147.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 148.
29. Id.
30. The court has the authority to order involuntary corporate dissolution pursu-
ant to Virginia Code section 13.1-747. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 1993
& Cum. Supp. 1998).
31. See Stickley, 43 Va. Cir. at 149. The court has the authority to order the
appointment of a receiver to wind up and liquidate the corporation pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code section 13.1-748. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-748 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
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Eastern Industrial Services, Inc. v. Lee32 is another case deal-
ing with corporate dissolution. The corporation brought suit in
its own name seeking, among other actions, that the court
liquidate it. Accordingly, the Amherst Circuit Court analyzed
the application of Virginia Code section 13.1-747' and held
that a corporation cannot bring an action in its own name for
dissolution.' The circuit court held that an action for corpo-
rate dissolution must be brought by a shareholder, a creditor,
or the board of directors. 5 In addition, the corporation must
be named as the defendant in such a case."5
2. Validity of Final Judgment Against Foreign Corporation
Without Certificate of Authority
In Quarles v. Miller,37 the Colonial Electric Company ("Colo-
nial") was a South Carolina corporation that did not have a
certificate of authority to transact business in Virginia. Colonial
entered into a written contract with Commonwealth Capital
Corporation ("Commonwealth") in Charlottesville, Virginia. The
contract indicated that Commonwealth agreed to establish fund-
ing for Colonial's real estate project in South Carolina. The
contract was executed by the vice president of Commonwealth.
Commonwealth neglected to fulfill its obligations to Colonial as
provided by the contract. Consequently, Colonial filed suit
against both Commonwealth and its vice president to enforce
the contract.'
The Charlottesville Circuit Court granted judgment against
Commonwealth, and the Supreme Court of Virginia granted
judgment against both Commonwealth and its vice president;
holding the vice president personally liable for Commonwealth's
obligations to Colonial.39 Soon after, Colonial fied suit against
Commonwealth's vice president in state court, alleging fraudu-
lent conveyance, and was granted judgment. In response,
32. 43 Va. Cir. 252 (Amherst County 1997).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
34. See Lee, 43 Va. Cir. at 253.
35. See id. at 253, 255.
36. See id. at 255.
37. 86 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1996).
38. See id. at 55.
39. See id.
19981 1073
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Commonwealth's vice president filed suit in state court assert-
ing that the judgment entered against him was void because
Colonial, a South Carolina corporation, lacked a certificate of
authority to transact business in the Commonwealth of Virgin-
ia.'
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 13.1-758, "[a] foreign corpo-
ration transacting business in... [Virginia] without a certifi-
cate of authority may not maintain a proceeding in any court
in... [Virginia] until it obtains a certificate of authority.""
Interpreting this statute, the court contended that the statute
applied differently in cases of ongoing litigation than in cases
where the court has entered a final judgment."' The court in-
terpreted this provision to allow it discretion to require a for-
eign corporation that does not have a certificate of authority to
obtain such certificate before it can continue in litigation.'
The court, however, relying on Phlegar v. Virginia Foods,
Inc.,' asserted that a valid final judgment, which is issued by
a court having personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the
parties involved and which is obtained by a foreign corporation
transacting business without a certificate of authority, is not
void because of the failure of the foreign corporation to comply
with Virginia Code section 13.1-758."5
3. Continuity of Corporations-Successor Liability
In Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Clary & Moore, P.C.,"
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan ("Kaiser") obtained a money
judgment against Clary, Lawrence, Lickstein & Moore, P.C. (the
"old firm"), a law firm, for unpaid rent. The old firm went into
bankruptcy and was terminated due to severe financial difficul-
ties, and Clary & Moore, P.C. ("Clary") was established to re-
place the old firm." During the short duration of time when
40. See id
41. V& CODE ANN. § 13.1-758(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
42. See Quarles, 86 F.3d at 58.
43. See id. (citing Video Eng'g Co. v. Foto-Video Elecs., Inc., 207 Va. 1027, 154
S.E.2d 7 (1967); Phlegar v. Virginia Foods, Inc., 188 Va. 747, 51 S.E.2d 227 (1949)).
44. 188 Va. at 747, 51 S.E.2d at 227.
45. See Quarles, 86 F.3d at 59 (citing Phlegar, 188 Va. at 747, 51 S.E.2d at 227).
46. 123 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 1997).
47. See id. at 202.
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both law firms were in existence, the new firm leased office
furniture, equipment, and the services of the old firm's attor-
neys and staff, operated in the same office as the old firm,
borrowed money from the old firm, and paid some of the debts
of the old firm. After the old firm ceased to exist, almost all of
the assets, employees, and clients of the old firm transferred to
the new firm."
The debt owed to Kaiser was never paid by the old firm.
Kaiser filed suit against Clary, alleging that Clary was obligat-
ed to pay the debts of the old firm because Clary was a mere
continuation of the old firm. Virginia has ruled against succes-
sor liability49 except in certain situations, such as when the
purchasing firm is merely a continuation of the selling firm. 0
The court evaluated the following factors to determine wheth-
er Clary was a mere continuation of the old firm. First, "[t]he
most critical element ... is showing the same ownership- of the
two companies, a 'common identity of the officers, directors, and
stockholders in the selling and purchasing corporations."' Sec-
ond, a party must show that "the new corporation continues in
the same business as its predecessor, although courts point out
that this is less important than identity of ownership."52 Third,
a party must show that "transfer of the selling company's as-
sets was done for less than adequate consideration."53 Addi-
tionally, the court considered whether "only one [corporation]
remain[ed] after the transaction at issue and whether the new
company continues in the old offices with the same telephone
number and address as the old company."' Applying these
48. See id
49. See id. at 204. "In Virginia, as in most states, a company-that purchases or
otherwise receives the assets of another company is generally not liable for the debts
and liabilities of the selling corporation." Id
50. See id. at 205 (quoting Harris v. T.I., Inc., 243 Va. 63, 70, 413 S.E.2d 605,
609 (1992)). The other exceptions to the rule against successor liability are as follows:
"(1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agreed to assume such liabili-
ties, (2) the circumstances surrounding the transaction warrant a finding that there
was a consolidation or de facto merger of the two corporations ... (3) the transac-
tion is fraudulent in fact." Id. at 204.
51. Id. (quoting Harris, 243 Va. at 70, 413 S.E.2d at 609).
52. Id. (citing Crawford Harbor v. Blake Constr. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880, 885 (E.D.
Va. 1987)).
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Blizzard v. Natl RR. Passenger Corp., 831 F. Supp. 544, 548 (E.D.
1998] 1075
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factors, the court held that Clary was a mere continuation of
the old firm.55
4. Alter-Egos, Piercing the Corporate Veil, and Equitable
Subordination
In Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH v. Project Asia
Line, Inc.,56 a vessel was sold to satisfy outstanding maritime
liens. The court gave first priority to a bank holding a first
preferred foreign ship mortgage. Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bis-
choff GmbH ("Ost"), holding a claim for unpaid charter hire for
use of a different vessel by Project Asia Line, Inc.'s ("Pro-
ject"),57 and Banchory Shipping Co., Ltd. ("Banchory"), holding
a similar claim against Project, attempted to collect their claims
from the proceeds that resulted from the sale of the vessel.'
The court declared that, in order for Ost and Banchory to
share in the proceeds, they must show that Project held some
property interest in the vessel." Ost and Banchory argued
that Project and Empire Shipping, S.A. ("Empire"), the regis-
tered owner of the vessel, were alter-egos. ° They further as-
serted that Project was the "owner-in-fact" of the vessel.6'
Virginia courts tend to uphold the separate identities of cor-
porations. Courts will, however, look beyond the corporate
structure and find that one corporation is acting merely as an
alter-ego of another corporation if several of the following fac-
tors are present:
gross under capitalization of the subservient corporation, a
failure to observe corporate formalities between the two, the
nonpayment of dividends, the insolvency of the subservient
corporation, the siphoning of funds from the subservient
Va. 1993)).
55. See id. In arriving at its ruling, the court also considered the fact that both
law firms concentrated in the same area of law and that the old firm ceased opera-
tions soon after the transfer of all its assets to Clary. See id. at 206-08.
56. 970 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Va. 1997).
57. Project is the charterer of the vessel in question in this case. See id. at 478.
58. See iUL
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corporation, the non-fimctioning officers or directors, an
absence of corporate records, and complete control by a
dominant stockholder. Additionally, an element of injustice
or fundamental unfairness must be present. 2
Applying these factors, the court proclaimed that Project and
Empire were not alter-egos because the "traditional hallmarks
of corporate irregularity" were not present."
In Commonwealth v. Greenberg," the Circuit Court of the
City of Richmond determined whether it should pierce the cor-
porate veil and hold Jerome Greenberg, an officer, director, and
shareholder of Allstate Express Check Cashing, Inc. ("Allstate"),
personally liable for violating provisions of the Virginia Con-
sumer Finance Act ("the Act"). Allstate not only cashed its
customer's checks but, for a fee, Allstate would also advance
cash to its customers without depositing those customers'
checks until a later date. The court held that, by its actions,
Allstate was making loans to its customers. As such, Allstate
was required to comply with the provisions of the Act. The
court, however, found that Allstate's fees far exceeded the limits
imposed by the Act."
With respect to Greenberg's personal liability, courts in Vir-
ginia will not pierce the corporate veil unless the following two
factors are present: (1) "a showing that the corporate entity was
the alter ego, alias, stooge, or dummy of the individuals sought
to be held personally liable;" and (2) "a showing that the corpo-
ration was used as a device or sham to disguise wrongs, ob-
scure fraud, or conceal crime.' ° The court held that these ele-
ments were not present in this case.67 Although there was evi-
dence that Allstate violated the Act, the court ruled that there
62. Id at 478 (citing Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989);
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686-87 (4th
Cir. 1976)).
63. Id. at 483.
64. 42 Va. Cir. 160 (Richmond City 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 255 Va.
594, 499 S.E.2d 266 (1998).
65. See id. at 160.
66. Id. at 161 (citing Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 234 Va. 207,
212, 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987)).
67. See id. at 161.
19981 1077
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was no evidence to indicate that Greenberg created the corpo-
ration to conceal his violation of the Act.' Furthermore, the
court determined that Greenberg established the corporation to
limit his personal liability, which is the purpose of incorpora-
tion; therefore, he cannot be held personally liable unless there
is evidence to show that he "was attempting to hide his mis-
deeds by creating an incorporated entity."
Alternatively, the Commonwealth of Virginia argued that
Greenberg should be personally liable because he actively par-
ticipated in the violation of the Act. Liability on this theory is
completely distinct from liability based on the theory of piercing
the corporate veil. To impose liability under the active partici-
pation theory, the Commonwealth must show only that
Greenberg had knowledge of the corporation's actions and ap-
proved them. Based on evidence that Greenberg was attempting
to hide the fact that the corporation was making illegal loans,
the circuit court held that Greenberg'was aware and approved
of the corporation's actions and could be held personally lia-
ble.7
0
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's use of the active participation theory to hold Greenberg
personally liable and affirmed the circuit court's refusal to
pierce the corporate veil.71
5. Shareholder's Derivative Suit
In Milstead v. Bradshaw," the Circuit Court of the City of
Norfolk examined the issue of whether a final divorce decree
was a sufficient equitable interest for standing to bring a
shareholder's derivative suit.73 A final divorce decree awarded
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 162-63.
71. See Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 594, 600-01, 499 S.E.2d 266, 270
(1998).
72. 43 Va. Cir. 428 (Norfolk City 1997).
73. A shareholder's right to bring a derivative suit is one crucial means by which
shareholders may protect their interest in a corporation. Normally, a shareholder does
not have the right to bring suit in his or her own name, but when a corporation
refuses to take action, the shareholder can step forth on an individual basis. The
court will not allow a shareholder to file a derivative suit unless he or she makes a
1078
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Theresa Milstead 100 shares of Currents General, Inc. The
shares constituted a thirty-three percent interest in the corpora-
tion. By virtue of this transfer of stock, Milstead argued that
she was a shareholder and, thus, had standing to bring a de-
rivative suit against Currents General, Inc. 4
Virginia Code section 13.1-672.1(A) provides that only a
shareholder may bring a derivative suit."5 In addition, the
shareholder must have owned stocks in the corporation at the
time of the alleged wrongful act, received stocks from a person
who was a shareholder at the time of the alleged wrongful act,
or owned stocks prior to public disclosure of the alleged wrong-
ful act without knowledge of such alleged wrongful act.76 The
final requirement for standing to bring a derivative suit is that
the shareholder must "fairly and adequately represent ... the
interest of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corpora-
tion."7
Theresa Milstead's husband argued that she lacked standing
to bring a derivative suit because she was not a shareholder.
Theresa Milstead argued that she had standing to bring a de-
rivative suit because her final divorce decree is a "nominee
certificate," thereby making her a shareholder. The court, how-
ever, rejected this argument because a procedure for nominee
certificate was absent from the bylaws of Currents General,
Inc."8 In this case, the stocks could not have been directly is-
sued by the corporation because there was no provision allow-
ing such action in the bylaws, hence, the transfer of stock re-
sulting from the divorce decree could not be considered a nomi-
nee certificate. 9
demand upon the corporation and the corporation fails to act within 90 days. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993). If the shareholder can show that the
corporation has rejected his or her demand or that there will be irreparable injury to
the corporation if the corporation fails to act, then the shareholder will not have to
wait until the expiration of the 90-day period. See id.
74. See Milstead, 43 Va. Cir. at 431-32.
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
76. See id § 13.1-672.1(A)(1)-(3) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
77. Id. § 13.1-672.1(AX4) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
78. See Milstead, 43 Va. Cir. at 431.
79. See i&
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Theresa Milstead then argued that the final divorce decree
gave her an equitable ownership interest in Currents General,
Inc. The circuit court, relying on case law from other jurisdic-
tions, agreed with her."0 Consequently, holders of equitable or
beneficial interests in shares of stock of a corporation have
standing to commence a shareholder's derivative suit.8 Actual
record ownership of shares is no longer necessary to bring a de-
rivative suit."
6. Personal Liability
In Eckelman v. Marina Resorts Group, Inc.,' the Fairfax
County Circuit Court determined whether the two agents of
Marina Resorts Group, Inc. ("Marina") would be personally
liable for the terms of a written contract. Marina needed com-
mercial financing and obtained the help of Daniel Eckelman, a
commercial loan finder. Emergy Boudreau, president and direc-
tor of Marina, agreed to pay Eckelman a finder's commission
fee and signed a fee agreement, which was written on corporate
stationary. Upon the placement of the commercial loan, Mr.
Boudreau and his wife were required to be personal guarantors
of the corporate obligation. Eckelman never received his finder's
commission fee and brought suit in an effort to hold the
Boudreau's personally liable for payment of the fee.'
iEckelman argued that Mr. Boudreau was personally liable
because of his signed letter and that Mr. and Mrs. Boudreau
were both personally liable because they were personal guaran-
tors on the deed of trust note to the lending institution. The
court, however, rejected these arguments.' First, the court
held that Mr. Boudreau was not personally liable for the
finder's commission fee by virtue of the signed letter because,
although the letter established an agreement by Marina to pay
a finder's commission fee, it did not evidence his personal
80. See id. at 431-32.
81. See id. at 432, 436.
82. See id. at 432.
83. 43 Va. Cir. 537 (Fairfax County 1997).
84. See id at 538-39.
85. See id. at 537, 539.
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agreement to pay the finder's fee." Second, the court held that
Mr. and Mrs. Boudreau could not be held personally liable by
virtue of the deed of trust note because, although they agreed
to act as personal guarantors for the commercial loan, they did
not agree to act as personal guarantors of the finder's fee.8 7
7. Indemnification
In Davison v. FastComm Communications Corp.," the
Loudoun County Circuit Court determined if, and when, officers
and directors of a corporation are entitled to receive indemnifi-
cation for their reasonable expenses. Pursuant to an Indemnifi-
cation Agreement, the officer was entitled to indemnification for
the "reasonable legal fees and expenses" incurred from the
investigation, conducted by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC"). 9 In addition, the court held that, pursuant to
Virginia Code section 13.1-700.1,' the officer is entitled to in-
demnification for reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the
court's order of indemnification, which necessarily includes
reasonable attorney's fees.9
The court applied the standard established in Mullins v.
Richlands National Bank," which required the factfinder "to
determine from the evidence what are reasonable fees under
the factual circumstances of the particular case."93 In applying
the Mullins standard, the court found that it was necessary to
"consider such circumstances as time consumed, effort expend-
ed, the nature of the services rendered, as well as the expert
testimony offered by the parties.' 4
86. See id. at 538-39.
87. See id. at 539.
88. 42 Va. Cir. 76 (Loudoun County 1997).
89. See id. at 77.
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-700.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
91. See Davison, 42 Va. Cir. at 77. "Expenses" is defined in Virginia Code section
13.1-696 to include reasonable attorney's fees. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-696 (Repl.
Vol. 1993).
92. 241 Va. 447, 403 S.E.2d 334 (1991).
93. Davison, 42 Va. Cir. at 77 (citing Mulins, 241 Va. at 449, 403 S.E.2d at 335.
94. Id.
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The court determined that the officer should be reimbursed
for all expenses that were billed and that were attributable to
the SEC investigation.95 The court was not as generous with
respect to those expenses incurred in obtaining an order of
indemnification from the court. In particular, the court opined
that the attorneys employed by the officer in this case "over-
lawyered, over-tried, and over-papered" this simple indemnifica-
tion proceeding.96 If the matter can be handled by a competent
local trial attorney, who could achieve similar results, then any
attorney's fees that exceed those of the trial attorney are exces-
sive.9" The court allowed the officer to be indemnified only for
an amount it thought to be reasonable given the circumstances
of the case. In doing so, the court reduced both the hourly rate.
and the amount of time spent in preparation of litigation.98
III. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
A. 1997 Legislation
1. Articles of Organization
The 1997 Session of the Virginia General Assembly amended
Virginia Code section 13.1-1011,"9 which sets forth the infor-
mation that is required in the articles of organization of a lim-
ited liability company. The articles are no longer required to
state when the limited liability company will be dissolved and
its affairs wound up."°
2. Members
Virginia Code section 13.1-1038.1 lists the statutory require-
ments for an individual to acquire a membership, interest in-a
95. See id. at 79.
96. Id. at 77.
97. See id. at 82.
98. See id. at 81-85.
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1011(AX1)-(3) (Cum. 'Supp. 1998).
100. See id.
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limited liability company.' A limited liability company al-
ways retains the right to establish its own standards and re-
quirements for attaining membership interest."° When such
standards are absent from the limited liability company's oper-
ating agreement, however, the provisions of Virginia Code sec-
tion 13.1-1038.1 govern.
Prior to the General Assembly's amendment of this section in
1997, an individual had to receive the consent of all current
members of the limited liability company as a condition to at-
taining a membership interest. The General Assembly lessened
this stringent condition and refined its application. If the limit-
ed liability company is managed by managers, then an individ-
ual seeking a membership interest must only receive a majority
of the current managers' consent."° If the limited liability
company is managed by members, then the individual' must
only receive the majority of the current members' consent.'
A person who has acquired another person's interest in the
limited liability company may become a member upon the oc-
currence of certain conditions provided for in Virginia Code sec-
tion 13.1-1040.°5 The strict conditions required by Virginia
Code section 13.1-1038.1 prior to its amendment, as discussed
above, also were imposed on assignees who desired to become
members of the limited liability company."° Accordingly, a
similar change was made to Virginia Code section 13.1-1040. If
the limited liability company is managed by members, then the
assignee can become a member upon receiving the consent of a
majority of the members, excluding the member who is the
assignor."° If the limited liability company is managed by
managers, then the assignee has to receive the consent of a
majority of the managers who are also members, excluding the
member who is the assignor."
101. See id. § 13.1-1038.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
102. If this is the case, then Virginia Code section 13.1-1038.1(A) does not operate
with respect to that limited liability company. See id. § 13.1-1038.1 (Cum. Supp.
1998).
103. See id. § 13.1-1038.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
104. See id.
105. Id. § 13.1-1040 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
106. See id. § 13.1-1040 (RepI. Vol. 1993).
107. See id. § 13.1-1040(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
108. See id.
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3. Dissolution
In 1996, the Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia
Code section 13.1-1046(3), governing dissolutions of limited
liability companies; however, this section was amended again in
1997." Virginia Code section 13.1-1046 provides that a limit-
ed liability company will be dissolved and its affairs wound up
if certain enumerated events take place."0 One such event is
the termination of a membership interest in the limited liability
company, resulting from, for example, death or resignation,
unless the articles of organization or operating agreement
provide otherwise."' A majority vote of the remaining mem-
bers of the limited liability company can save the company
from dissolution." If the limited liability company is man-
aged by managers and if there is at least one member who is a
manager, then there must be a majority vote of the remaining
members who also are managers of the limited liability
company.1
The General Assembly made one further amendment to this
section by adding an additional event by which a limited liabili-
ty company could be dissolved. Virginia Code section 13.1-1062
requires that a limited liability company pay an annual regis-
tration fee." If the fee is not paid by a date specified in sec-
tion 13.1-1064, then the Commission will automatically cancel
its certificate."5 Automatic cancellation of a limited liability




A limited liability company is a hybrid of a corporation and a
partnership. It combines the advantages of both business forms





114. See id. § 13.1-1062 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
115. See id.
116. See id § 13.1-1046(1X5) (Cur. Supp. 1998).
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into one. Limited liability companies are acquiring more and
more of the advantages of the corporation. In 1998, the General
Assembly granted members of a limited liability company two
additional managerial powers that are very similar to those
possessed by directors of a corporation. First, members of a
limited liability company now have the power to delegate their
powers of management and control to officers, agents, and em-
ployees." Second, members have the power to take action
without holding a meeting, giving notice, or voting if they have
signed written consents by those members entitled to vote."'
Also, members may vote by proxy.1 19 All of these rights and
powers have become the default rule and cannot be taken away
unless so stated in the articles of organization or the operating
agreement.'
If the limited liability company is managed by managers as
opposed to members, then the provisions of Virginia Code sec-
tion 13.1-10241 govern the powers and rights of the manag-
er. This section has been amended in a manner similar to Vir-
ginia Code section 13.1-1022, discussed above. The managers of
a manager-managed limited liability company also have ac-
quired the additional rights and powers given to the members
in section 13.1-1022.12
C. Judicial Decisions
In Hagan v. Adams Property Associates, Inc.," the Su-
preme Court of Virginia determined whether or not a sale took
place between the owner of the property and the owner's lim-
ited liability company. Ralph and Maureen Hagan owned the
Stuart Court Apartments. The Hagans wanted to sell the. prop-
erty and entered into a written agreement with Adams Proper-
ty Associates, Inc. ("Adams"), granting them an exclusive right
to sell the property and offering a fee if the sale could be made
117. See id § 13.1-1022(D) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
118. See id. § 13.1-1022(E) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
119. See id.
120. See id § 13.1-1022(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
121. Id. § 13.1-1024 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
122. See id. § 13.1-1024(H)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
123. 253 Va. 217, 482 S.E.2d 805 (1997).
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within one year. Prior to the end of one year, Hagan formed
the Hagan, Parsons & Tepper, L.L.C. and conveyed the proper-
ty to the company. Adams brought suit against the Hagans
seeking payment of the fee." 4
The Hagans argued that Adams is not entitled to payment of
the fee because no sale took place. The Hagans contended that
the transaction lacked valuable consideration and that it was
merely a "contribution to the capitalization of [his] new compa-
ny."12 The court rejected this argument and found that the
Hagans received valuable consideration in exchange for the
conveyance of the property.12' The court held that the Hagans
did receive valuable consideration because the limited liability
company took over the first deed of trust note on the property,
which has not been fully paid." In addition, the Hagans ob-
tained a note that was secured by a second deed of trust on the
property. Finally, the Hagans received an interest in the limit-
ed liability company. The court ruled that all these benefits
were valid consideration for the conveyance of the property to
the company." Moreover, the court held that the limited lia-
bility -ompany was a separate entity; therefore, the conveyance
of the property from Hagan to the company constituted "more
than a change in the form of ownership."" Consequently, Ad-
ams was entitled to payment of its fees for selling the property
to the limited liability company.
IV. PARTNERSHIPS
A. 1997 and 1998 Legislation
1. Inclusion of Partnerships in the Virginia Stock Corporation
Act
Several sections of the Virginia Code were amended to in-.
clude partnerships. The 1997 Session amended Virginia Code
124. See id.
125. Id. at 219, 482 S.E.2d at 806.
126. See id. at 219-20, 482 S.E.2d at 807.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 220, 482 S.E.2d at 807.
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section 13.1-722 (A) to permit partnerships to merge with do-
mestic corporations. 30 These mergers are governed by the law
of the state or, in the case of a foreign partnership, the country
where the partnership is incorporated. 3' In addition, section
13.1-722(A)(1)(c)"' requires that domestic partnerships comply
with article 9 of the Virginia Uniform Partnership Act."
As a result of the amendments made to the above provisions
of the Virginia Code, the 1997 Session had to amend Virginia
Code section 13.1-766.1, governing mergers that involve a for-
eign corporation." Partnerships that survive the merger with
a foreign corporation are bound by the requirements in section
13.1-766.1, namely the filing of an authenticated copy of the
instrument of merger with the Commission, the receipt of a
certificate of authority if the partnership wants to conduct
business in Virginia, and the registration of the partner-
ship." 5 In light of the addition of partnerships to Virginia
Code sections 13.1-722(A) and 13.1-766.1, the definitions section
of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act has been expanded to
include three paragraph definings "domestic partnership,"
"foreign partnership," and "foreign registered limited liability
partnership.""5
2. Inclusion of Partnerships in the Virginia Limited Liability
Act
Partnerships can be converted to limited liability companies
130. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-722(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
131. See id. § 13.1-722(A)(1Xa) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
132. Id. § 13.1-722(A)(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
133. Id. §§ 50-73.124 to -73.131 (Repl. Vol. 1998). Virginia Code section 50-73.128
requires that the merger comply not only with the law of the state or country where
each party to the merger is incorporated, but also with all domestic partnership
agreements. See id. § 50-73.128(A) (Repl. Vol. 1998). Furthermore, each domestic
partnership must approve a plan of merger that supplies the information requested.
See id. § 50-73.128(BX1)-(6) (Repl. Vol. 1998). The surviving entity must take over all
assets, debts, and obligations of all entities whose existence has ceased due to the
merger. See id. § 50-73.129(AX1)-(4) (Repl. Vol. 1998). And finally, the surviving enti-
ty must file a statement of merger that includes the information requested. See id. §
50.73.131(BX1)-(4) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
134. See id. § 13.1-766.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
135. See id. § 13.1-766.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
136. Id. § 13.1-603 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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pursuant to Virginia Code section 13.1-1010.1.117 Prior to the
1997 amendment, only a general partnership could convert,
whereas after the amendment, domestic, foreign, and limited
partnerships can convert to limited liability companies."
Paragraphs defining domestic partnerships and foreign partner-
ships have been added to Virginia Code section 13.1-1002.1"
The amended section also has a paragraph defining foreign
registered limited liability partnerships."4 Conversion from a
partnership to a limited liability company occurs upon the filing
of articles of organization which includes the name of the con-
verting partnership." If the conversion is by a registered lim-
ited liability partnership, then the articles of organization must
contain the date and place of filing of its registration or state-
ment of partnership.4 2 The 1998 Session has deleted the re--
quirement that the date and place of filing of the initial certifi-
cate of partnership be included in the articles of organiza-
tion."
Prior to the 1997 amendment, the filing of the articles of
organization mentioned above served as a certificate of cancella-
tion of a limited partnership; however, the 1997 Sessionof the
Virginia General Assembly simultaneously narrowed and ex-
panded the scope of this provision.' Articles of organization
that have been filed can serve as a certificate of cancellation if
the entity is a domestic limited partnership.' Additionall3,
the articles of organization can serve as a statement of dissolu-
137. Id. § 13.1-1010.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
138. See id. § 13.1-1010.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
139. Id. 13.1-1002 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
140. See id. These definitions also have been added to Virginia Code section 50-
73.1 which governs limited partnerships. See id. § 50-73.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998). The
addition of these definitions are identical to those in Virginia Code. section 13.1-603
which governs Virginia corporations. See id. § 13.1-603 (Cum. Supp. 1998); see supra
note 136 and accompanying text. Virginia Code section 13.1-1002 also has a new
paragraph defining non-United States entities. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Curn.
Supp. 1998). This definition becomes applicable in Virginia Code section 13.1-1067
which requires the Commission, if requested, to issue a certificate of change of name
or conversion when a non-United States entity is domesticated as a limited liability
company. See id. § 13.1-1067(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
141. See id. § 13.1-1010.1(A)(1) (Cure. Supp. 1998).
142. See id. § 13.1-1010.1(AX2) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
143. See id. § 13.1-1010.1(A) (Cure. Supp. 1998).
144. See id. § 13.1-1010.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998)
145. See i.
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tion and cancellation of registration if the entity is a domestic
partnership.'
Not only can partnerships be converted to limited liability
companies, but they can also be merged with limited liability
companies pursuant to Virginia Code section 13.1-1070.4" The
amendments made to sections 13.1-1060 and 13.1-1070' are
similar to the amendments made to sections 13.1-722 and 13.1-
766.1, which govern the merger of a partnership with a corpo-
ration.' If a partnership is involved in the merger, as re-
quired by any other entity, the surviving partnership will have
to file articles of merger, pursuant to the amended provisions of
Virginia Code section 13.1-1072(A), after the plan of merger has
been approved by each party involved in the merger."50
3. Title 50-Partnerships
The 1997 General Assembly made numerous changes to the
provisions of title 50 of the Virginia Code. Most of the changes
in this title reflect those that were made to various sections in
title 13 of the Virginia Code, particularly the amendments al-
lowing partnerships to merge with a corporation and a limited
liability company. The 1998 Session of the Virginia General
Assembly did not make further changes to any provisions of
this title.
146. See i&
147. See id. § 13.1-1070 (Cum. Supp. 1998). Upon the merger of any limited liabili-
ty company with any other entity, or upon the conversion of any entity to a foreign
limited liability company, the Commission, if requested, will issue a certificate stating
who has ownership of or interest in real estate. See id. § 13.1-1067(B) (Cum. Supp.
1998). Virginia Code section 50-37.3, governing general partnerships, and section 50-
73.130, which is the Virginia Uniform Partnership Act, have been similarly changed.
See id. §§ 50-37.3, -73.130 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
148. I. §§ 13.1-1060, -1070 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
149. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
150. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1072(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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B. Judicial Decision
In Pitsilides v. Lawyers Title Insurance Co.,' the Virginia
Beach Circuit Court determined whether or not a conveyance of
partnership property to a partner, as trustee, constituted a pur-
chase. George Pitsilides was a partner of G & J Land Compa-
ny, which owned two parcels of land. When the partnership
was dissolved, one parcel of land, which had a title defect, was
conveyed to Pitsilides, as trustee of a trust. Pitsilides wanted
the partnership's title insurance policy to compensate him for
the defect.'52
The title insurance company refused to insure the defect in
title because it considered Pitsilides a purchaser of the proper-
ty. The policy only insured the partnership and any person or
entity who attained ownership by operation of law.'" The cir-
cuit court agreed with the title insurance company and denied
compensation to Pitsilides.'" Although Pitsilides could have
obtained ownership of the property by operation of law, the
circuit court held that Pitsilides, as trustee, could not receive




Despite the abundant changes that already have been made
to numerous provisions of title 13.1 and title 50 of the Virginia
Code, the Virginia General Assembly undoubtedly will continue
to make more changes in the future. Accordingly, courts will
continue to interpret and refine the law affecting corporations,
limited liability companies, and partnerships.
151. 42 Va. Cir. 54 (Virginia Beach City 1997).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 55.
154. See id
155. See id. The title insurance company probably would have insured the title
defect if the property had been conveyed to Pitsilides, as an individual, instead of
Pitsilides, as trustee. A good argument can be made that once a partnership is dis-
solved, a partner can acquire property belonging to the partnership by operation of
law. See id.
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